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“‘The contraband’s death is more miserable than her life’: violence, visibility, and the 
medicalization of freedom in the American Civil War.” 
 
 
“The huge green fragment of ice on which she alighted pitched and creaked as her weight 
came on it, but she staid there not a moment. With wild cries and desperate energy she leaped 
to another and still another cake;—stumbling—leaping—slipping—springing upwards again! 
Her shoes are gone—her stockings cut from her feet—while blood marked every step; but she 
saw nothing, felt nothing, till dimly, as in a dream, she saw the Ohio side, and a man helping 
her up the bank.” 
(Harriet Beecher Stowe, Uncle Tom’s Cabin, 1852)1 
 
-----0----- 
 
“People at the North knew but little of slavery,” the white missionary and teacher Elizabeth 
Hyde Botume recalled, looking back to the Civil War from the vantage point of 1893; for 
most, at the time, the landscape of the South was “terra incognita to them.” And against that 
landscape, as Botume realized, the view of individual slaves, and especially female slaves, 
became obscured. Outside of abolitionist literature, they were neither the main focus of 
popular cultural representations of plantation life, nor central to the political arguments over 
slavery. But a decade before the Civil War, motion rendered at least one fictional female 
slave fully, albeit virtually, visible, to both a national and international audience: Eliza’s 
flight across the frozen Ohio River was, for many readers and illustrators, one of the critical 
moments of what a contemporary newspaper termed “the Story of the Age,” Harriet Beecher 
Stowe’s Uncle Tom’s Cabin: or, Life Among the Lowly (1852).2   
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Our own age, although sometimes somewhat dismissive of Stowe’s emotive novel, 
nevertheless seems equally drawn to the drama of displacement when it comes to the subject 
of female slaves and the Civil War. This may be an inevitable development. “As central as 
the story of black soldiering has been to our view of slaves and war,” Leslie Schwalm 
concluded in her 1997 study of female slaves in Civil War South Carolina, in fact “it was the 
flight of noncombatant slaves to Union lines that forced Union policy in new and 
unpredictable directions during the course of the war.”3  
 
Two decades later, and flight, not fight, is very much the focus of attention as historians seek 
to expand our understanding of the emancipation process; a process now less likely to be 
structured around Frederick Douglass’s famous injunction to African American men to fight 
on the grounds of manhood than to highlight the infamous incident at Camp Nelson, 
Kentucky, in 1864 when the families of black troops were forcibly evicted from the camp in 
the depths of winter to perish in the cold. Freedom, the standard under which many black 
troops rallied to the Union cause, all too often translated, for their families, into the freedom 
to suffer and die on the harsh middle ground between slavery and freedom, the Union and the 
Confederacy, in the hastily-constructed contraband camps or on the roads leading to these. 
For many, there was really no choice at all. Death and suffering were near certainties whether 
an individual slave chose to remain with an enslaver or flee to Union lines. Human cruelty 
was not the sole cause of the suffering. Disease was rife in an environment that served, in 
Chandra Manning’s phrase, as an “epidemiological incubator” for the smallpox virus and for 
bacterial infections such as cholera. But if human actions did not prompt the problem, human 
ignorance, disorganization and, sometimes, simple disregard for the lives of others certainly 
compounded it. In many cases, as Jim Downs powerfully reminds us, black refugees “did not 
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die from complicated medical ailments or unknown diseases; they died because they did not 
have basic necessities.”4 
 
Earlier studies were not oblivious to the compromises and the cruelties – 
personal, practical, and political – that attended the process of emancipation in the Civil War 
era. From being one element in the story, however, the trials and the tragedies have gradually 
moved centre-stage in the narrative of emancipation; part of a new historiographical 
trajectory that is working to extend the life cycle of the Civil War beyond the battlefield and 
assess both its immediate and longer-term impact on combatants and non-combatants alike. 
Downs’ analysis of the dire health conditions that accompanied emancipation is, in fact, just 
one part of a more widespread revisionism that reached its apogee, for the war years at least, 
with Michael C.C. Adams’ analysis of the “pain, heartbreak, and tragedy” that “the terrible 
infliction of physical and mental wounds, the misery of soldiers living amid corpses, filth, 
and flies” produced.5 
 
This increased emphasis upon the physical and mental trauma of the Civil War has been 
driven by an increasing scholarly disquiet; the sense, as David Blight put it, that as far as the 
war is concerned, we have for too long “preferred its music and pathos to its enduring 
challenges, the theme of reconciled conflict to resurgent, unresolved legacies.” And the 
suffering of the South’s black refugees fleeing slavery is certainly one of the clearest and 
more troubling aspects of the Civil War for a nation that, at various points since 1865, has 
struggled to live up to what Blight has described as the war’s “emancipationist legacy,” 
largely because of the ways in which this suffering stands as condemnation and contradiction 
of northern liberation narratives that position the Civil War as the crucial catalyst for a new, 
national birth of freedom. In this respect, however, the historiographical emphasis on death 
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and disease, or on the many and varied shortcomings of both the Lincoln Administration and 
the Union Army in regards to black refugees can only take us so far; not least because much 
of the discussion to date delineates a world so entirely distinct from the military, medical and 
materiél realities of the Civil War as to constitute a parallel universe, one located in twentieth 
and twenty-first century debates about health provision and support for displaced populations. 
Even if one believes, in the face of considerable contradictory evidence, that the modern 
bureaucratic behemoths that drive both the military and medical worlds of the developed 
nations are capable – morally, medically or materially – of coping adequately with current 
refugee crises, assessing the past from that perspective is problematic; critical but not 
contextual.6  
 
Context is crucial, however, to our understanding of the process of emancipation generally 
and the refugee experience as part of that more specifically: the military but also the medical 
context. The military context was determined by the matériel needs and the physical 
movement of the armies, the fluid nature of the fighting, the advance and retreat across a 
Southern landscape no longer terra incognita for Union soldiers but increasingly becoming 
so for white southerners; a landscape that threw into sharp relief the figure of the black 
refugee seeking relief. The Civil War had made of this landscape, to use the language of 
abolitionist and homeopath Laura Towne, one “of great distances in a small compass.”7 It 
was in many respects a militarized landscape, certainly, but it does not necessarily follow, as 
some have argued, that the tortuous pathways taken across it by black refugees were 
themselves militarized.8 In many respects, what we are looking at across the distance of over 
a century and a half is a medicalized landscape. By medicalized in this context is not meant 
simply the medicalization of the body, with either a gendered or racial determinant, by 
medical professionals but rather, as historian Robert Nye describes it, a more complex 
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“process whereby medical and health precepts have been embodied in individuals,” in this 
case, the Union Army and, behind it, the northern public.9  
 
The Civil War, in effect, witnessed an early iteration of what was later defined as the “moral 
economy,” a concept that can further our understanding of the ways in which “wider societal 
values frame the rhetoric distinguishing the ‘deserving refugee’ from the ‘false refugee,’ a 
distinction that,” Cécile Rousseau and Patricia Foxen have argued, informs both political and 
social responses to the dispossessed. Complicated, in the American case, by race and the 
legacy of slavery, the northern response to the Civil War’s black refugees was a crisis of 
compassion and empathy. It provides a prime example of the “challenge of understanding the 
feelings and experiences of others who have profoundly different representations of the self 
and the world,” a challenge faced by the Union Army and the northern public alike.10 The 
Union Army may have been the first point of contact, in practical as much as in 
psychological terms, for many black refugees in search of freedom, but it was not a fixed, 
physical or moral entity. It, like the landscape it was located within, was unstable and 
uncertain, both in terms of its geography and in the widely varying attitudes of its personnel 
toward the refugees.  
 
The Great Deep of Slavery 
 
The extent of the humanitarian crisis that accompanied the ending of slavery in the United 
States did not become fully apparent until the final years of the Civil War. By that conflict’s 
penultimate year, however, as slavery disintegrated even in the loyal Union Border States, 
where it had sustained an awkward and increasingly anomalous position in a Union 
increasingly committed not just to defeating the Confederacy but to effecting emancipation, 
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the seriousness of the situation was impossible to ignore. “The Great Deep of Slavery in 
Kentucky is broken up,” observed A.L. Robinson, the Surveyor of Customs in Evansville, 
Indiana to the Secretary of the Treasury, William Pitt Fessenden, “and the fragments are 
rapidly drifting northward across the Ohio River.” Although Kentucky had been exempted 
from the Union’s efforts to recruit African American men into the army, the very natural 
human impulse to escape bondage ensured that there were plenty of volunteers who removed 
themselves from slavery by signing up to fight. “The Men are entering the Union Army by 
hundreds and thousands,” Robinson informed Fessenden, but “their wives and children, 
following their husbands, without homes or even the necessaries of life are suffering now and 
unless they shall be cared for by the Government, many of them will no doubt perish during 
the winter which is fast approaching. The task” Robinson concluded, “is too great for private 
charity.”11 
 
Fragments of slavery had, of course, been drifting northward for many years prior to the Civil 
War. But individual flights to freedom, fictionalized and dramatized by authors such as 
Stowe, or represented factually and physically in individuals such as Harriet Jacobs or 
Frederick Douglass, offered no hint to the northern public that succeeding waves of desperate 
and destitute refugees would break upon the Union’s shores after Fort Sumter fell. By the 
time that Robinson conveyed his concerns to Fessenden in the fall of 1864, however, the 
situation was acute; for the Union as much as for the former slaves whose future was tied to 
the outcome of the war. The timing of Robinson’s letter, indeed, could not have been worse 
for the newly-appointed Secretary of the Treasury, given the precarious financial position that 
the Union found itself in by that point. In respect of the former slaves, Fessenden did what he 
could, waiving duties on foreign aid, and allocating $10,000 per month for medical supplies, 
but what he could do was limited in the context of overall Union expenditure. His attempt to 
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raise funds for the Union via the issuance of war bonds that year had fallen flat. Appeals to 
the patriotism of the North had failed. “The people are not awake to the urgency of the case,” 
Fessenden complained, “and I can see no way of opening their eyes.”12 
 
In many respects Fessenden’s cri de Coeur concerning Union finances and the northern 
public’s disinterest speaks to the larger question of the human cost of the conflict, the ways in 
which northerners, soldiers and civilians, federal and voluntary bodies alike, became aware of 
and motivated to respond to the black refugee crisis, and the longer-term implications of this 
response. Because the fact is that whilst a great many individuals were fully aware of the 
physical plight of the former slaves, the federal government, in the first few years of the war, 
had no eyes to see the problem, no resources to resolve it on the ground. Congress saw the 
former slaves, certainly, but in a conceptual sense as the focus of increasingly heated partisan 
debate concerning both the progress and purpose of the war and the role of emancipation in 
that. But it largely sidestepped – literally as well as figuratively, given that there were several 
refugee camps proximate to the Capitol – the wider issue of support for those who, having 
escaped slavery, found themselves homeless and destitute.  
 
In the very month that Abraham Lincoln issued the preliminary emancipation proclamation 
The Liberator printed part of Harriet Jacob’s letter to abolitionist leader William Lloyd 
Garrison detailing the condition of the black refugees housed on Duff Green’s Row, a terrace 
near Capitol Hill. They “were in the most pitiable condition,” Jacobs recounted. “Many were 
sick with measles, diphtheria, scarlet and typhoid fever. Some had a few filthy rags to lie on; 
others had nothing but the bare floor for a couch.” There were “as many as ten deaths” per 
day there, and the corpses lay together “without a shadow of those rites which we give to our 
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poorest dead,” Jacobs noted; “There they lie, in the filthy rags they wore from the plantation. 
Nobody seems to give it a thought.”13  
 
A year previously it had been a rather different picture. Initial press reports from the Union 
front line expressed little sense either of sickness or of suffering. Some, indeed, suggested 
that the influx of black refugees was less of a problem than an opportunity; in many cases, an 
opportunity for white officers. Some of the earliest reports to appear in the northern press and 
in periodicals such as Harper’s Weekly came from the Virginia Peninsula, specifically from 
Fort Monroe at its southern tip, where “[h]alf the Federal officers now have negro servants,” 
as the Trenton State Gazette reported in the early summer of 1861. This increasingly 
widespread practice concerned several Union commanders. It prompted General Benjamin F. 
Butler, for example, to issue an order to the effect that no officer would be permitted to retain 
servants “except upon condition that they shall be accounted for in his pay.” Butler’s ruling 
was, in part, an attempt to keep track of the actual numbers of fugitive slaves employed by 
the Union but, as the Trenton Gazette noted, this “was found to be impossible, their numbers 
increased so rapidly.”14  
 
Numbers were increasing rapidly at Fort Monroe, the “Keystone of the Union” as Butler later 
termed it, in large part because of his famous refusal, in May of 1861, to return fugitive 
slaves to their owners on the grounds that they constituted “contraband” property. 
Contemporary cartoons, woodcuts and even patriotic stationary represented Butler’s decision 
and its aftermath, but few publications considered the longer-term implications of what they 
were showing their readership.  
 
[INSERT FIGURE 1 HERE]  
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Figure 1: “Stampede among the Negroes in Virginia—their arrival at Fortress Monroe / from 
sketches by our Special Artist in Fortress Monroe,” Frank Leslie’s Illustrated Newspaper, 12: 
290 (June 8, 1861), courtesy of the Library of Congress Prints and Photographs Division 
Washington, D.C.: LC-DIG-ppmsca-33130. 
 
 
[INSERT FIGURE 2 HERE] 
 
Figure 2: [Contraband, Fortress Monroe, 1861], engraved envelope, courtesy of the Library 
of Congress Prints and Photographs Division Washington, D.C.: LC-DIG-ppmsca-11208. 
 
Foreign reporters, such as William Howard Russell of the Times, whilst they discussed 
Butler’s response to the refugee situation at Fort Monroe, similarly failed to consider the 
bigger picture; fascinated by the “military panorama” of the war itself, their focus was on the 
battlefield and not beyond. And although keen to explain the “slavery question” to an 
international audience, it was the debates in Congress, not the physical disintegration of the 
system that engaged most reporters’ attention. Most did not see a problem at all; for others, 
their silence stemmed from the recognition, as one put it, that the “sight of misery one cannot 
in any way relieve is a very painful one.”15  
 
Not everyone neglected to observe, or at least report, events as they unfolded. But written 
descriptions, as opposed to visual representations, of the flight of former slaves following the 
evacuation of Hampton in August, 1861, revealed a persistent trend in the northern press in 
the war’s early stages to present the “contrabands” as curiosities; part of the unfamiliar and in 
some respects exotic landscape of war, their plight was simultaneously self-evident and 
barely significant. One correspondent, whose report was reprinted in Harper’s, for example, 
acknowledged that the slaves’ escape from the town represented the desperate attempt to find 
“comfort and safety,” its haste inspired by the fear that “their masters should finally snatch 
them from their newly-found freedom, and again send them to the fields under the overseer’s 
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whip.” And yet the “exodus” that he witnessed struck him mainly as “the most laughable and 
at the same time pitiable sight I ever witnessed.”16 
 
For this journalist, at least, the implications of what he had seen rather passed him by. It was 
another matter for those faced with the influx of dispossessed slaves at Fort Monroe. Butler 
himself made a practical as well as a political point when, in light of the human response to 
his “contraband decision,” he sought advice from the Secretary of War in a telegram 
subsequently published in the New York Times. He stressed that the refugees now at the fort 
had been “obliged to break up their homes at Hampton, fleeing across the creek within my 
lines for protection and support,” and that they were not, as yet, a burden on the Union war 
effort; quite the opposite, since the men had been employed on the construction of 
entrenchments, and the “women were earning substantially their own subsistence in washing, 
marketing, and taking care of the clothes of the soldiers.” However, Butler continued, the 
practical question of their future support was pressing. If their former owners had “abandoned 
them to be swallowed up by the Winter storm of starvation,” it fell to the Union to secure 
their future. Only two weeks previously, Butler had sought State, rather than Federal aid to 
this end when he asked Massachusetts’ Governor John A. Andrew to permit the distribution 
of military fatigues to the fugitive slaves at the fort “some of whom are naked and 
suffering.”17  
 
Such aid as was made available was, perhaps inevitably, insufficient, since the federal 
government had not anticipated the extent of wartime displacements as did occur, and its 
military arm was constrained by an organizational remit that simply did not include care of 
non-combatants. At the start of 1862, Harper’s Weekly, finally awake to the health 
implications of the “contraband” question, alerted its readership to the “painfully crowded” 
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conditions at Fort Monroe, and observed that one “of the most practical questions of the 
rebellion” was “how, properly, to clothe and care for the ‘contrabands,’” not just in Virginia 
but wherever the Union “flag advances…It is not the fault of the poor contrabands that they 
are cold and hungry,” Harper’s argued, and reminded its readership that there was a moral 
and religious imperative to “clothe and feed them.” At the same time, on the Sea Islands of 
South Carolina, before the famous “Port Royal Experiment” got underway, the health crisis 
that accompanied slaver’s demise was all-too evident. Those slaves that remained on the 
abandoned plantations were “almost starving and some naked or nearly so,” according to 
Samuel F. Du Pont, commander of the South Atlantic Blockading Squadron then operating 
off Port Royal. This state of affairs prompted General Thomas W. Sherman to issue orders 
designed to address the “helpless condition of the blacks inhabiting the vast area in the 
occupation of” Union forces. Their plight, he stressed, “calls for immediate action on the part 
of a highly-favored and philanthropic people.”18 
 
The social, economic and educational “experiment” undertaken at Port Royal has been 
extensively documented and discussed by historians over the years. In many ways it was an 
experiment made possible only because the inhabitants of the Sea Islands constituted a 
largely stable population, one clearly visible to the “philanthropic people” of the northern 
states; not that this stability automatically ensured either survival or safety for the former 
slaves concerned, of course. Arriving in Beaufort, South Carolina, in the autumn of 1862, 
northern doctor Esther Hill Hawks was dismayed to discover the extent of the abuse suffered 
by black women at the hands of Union soldiers whose arrival the slaves had initially 
“hailed…so joyfully.” Indeed, Doctor Hawks confided to her diary, “during the first year of 
our soldiers coming the blacks probably suffered more from their tyranny and insults, than 
ever in their lives before…No colored woman or girl was safe from the brutal lusts of the 
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soldiers,” she continued, and she singled out for particular censure the colonel of the Fifty-
Fifth Pennsylvania Regiment who, she reported, “kept colored women for his especial 
needs.” No one, she fumed, “is punished for these offences, for the officers are as bad as the 
men.” The reality on the ground, as Doctor Hawks discovered, was a far cry indeed from 
contemporary newspaper accounts of the military heroics performed by the “gallant 55th 
Regiment” on the Sea Islands in 1862.19 
 
Doctor Hawks was wrong, however, in her assumption that assaults on black women went 
wholly unreported or unpunished; and, in fact, wrong to assert that soldiers were the sole 
culprits in these cases. Certainly, as Schwalm has argued, “rape and the threat of rape were 
part of life on the Union-occupied Sea Islands,” but the whole story is neither captured by nor 
ends in the assertion that this was (as it surely was) “a brutal manifestation of the contempt 
with which black women were viewed by many Northern whites.” Proximity to Union forces 
beyond the domestic environment (and sometimes within it) involved a high degree of risk 
for all women, white and black, suggesting that, up close and personal, individual callousness 
rather than a systemic white disregard for black life directed the narrative of Union 
occupation. And in some cases at least, such callousness did not go unchecked. With the 
violence came visibility for black women, a visibility not only previously denied them but 
unrelated to their contested status as slave or contraband, wife or mother, burden or benefit to 
the Union war effort; a visibility grounded in an original military legal understanding of them 
not as property but as people.20  
 
In circumstances that no woman would chose, it nevertheless was the case that the sexual 
violence endured by black women rendered them, in unprecedented ways, jurisprudentially 
visible in both a military and a medical context. Although sexual abuse was not officially 
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designated a military crime until 1863, it was recognized and assigned to “military 
commissions” whose role it was to try cases “which may not be cognizable by courts-martial” 
and whose remit clearly covered “any violence offered a female, white or colored,” said 
violence frequently confirmed by expert medical testimony. Consequently, several cases of 
rape and attempted rape came before both these commissions and military courts in the first 
few years of the Civil War. And a number of them concerned members of the Fifty-Fifth 
Pennsylvania, including its colonel, Richard White, and one of the regiment’s doctors, 
Assistant Surgeon Charles F. Lauer.21  
 
Of the two cases, White’s may seem at first glance the more typical of the Union’s undulating 
legal landscape. The attempted rape charge, one of several that he faced, was dismissed either 
through lack of evidence, or through an unwillingness to prosecute a senior officer, or 
because it was the case, as the court concluded, that “some unknown person” was, in fact, 
guilty. High-profile enough to reach the newspapers, White’s court-martial was also detailed 
enough in its “most revolting” evidence to cast a degree of suspicion over the outcome of 
proceedings, both at the time and since. Indeed, in the context of a martial culture predicated 
upon masculine honour, it is unlikely that the “not guilty” verdict ever entirely exonerated 
White from the charges preferred against him.22 
 
The case against regimental surgeon Charles F. Lauer, however, had a different outcome. 
Lauer was found guilty of assault and attempted rape on the Milne Plantation on Port Royal 
in 1862. Unlike White, Lauer appears to have been so persistent and so public a sexual 
predator that there was no shortage of witnesses willing to testify against him. And several of 
these witnesses were black women, a fact that Lauer tried to turn to his benefit by invoking a 
range of clichéd assumptions common enough at the time. First he tried to argue that the 
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women could not comprehend the meaning of an oath, and should not be permitted to testify 
against a white man on those grounds. Then he shifted tack to focus on the victims. He 
accused one of them of promiscuity, and sought to undermine the testimony of another by 
arguing that, so far from assaulting her, he had done nothing more than conduct a medical 
examination. This last suggestion seemed as implausible to the court at the time as it does to 
the reader today. But it was not the military court’s dismissal of Lauer’s testimony, rather its 
acceptance of that of southern black women that represented the most important shift; not just 
for the victims of Lauer’s attacks, but for the witnesses, formerly enslaved women whose 
legal status in 1862 was as yet uncertain, but whose legal standing, in a military environment 
that located them by role rather than race, was in many respects undifferentiated from that of 
white witnesses testifying about similar crimes.23 
   
A Veritable Moral Chaos 
 
In the relatively confined context of military courts, the martial and the medical clearly 
worked in tandem to heighten the visibility of individual black women, and especially those 
who although physically dispossessed were not geographically displaced and were accessible 
to the limited legal and medical resources of the Union Army. From a wider public 
perspective, however, and certainly from that of Union troops active in the field, such cases 
may have appeared more concerned with the maintenance of order within Union ranks than 
the securing of legal rights for African American women. They achieved little traction against 
the growing fear, as the war progressed, that black refugees constituted, in John Eaton’s 
opinion, “a menace to soldiers which it is difficult to overestimate.” The soldiers’ response, 
according to Eaton, Chaplain of the 27th Ohio, later tasked with the oversight of fugitive 
slaves in the Department of the Tennessee, was “bewilderment and panic” as they 
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contemplated “the demoralization and infection of the Union soldier and the downfall of the 
Union cause.” Indeed, when placed in the wider context of the war, it becomes evident that in 
subtle but significant ways courts-martial dealing with crimes against black women 
functioned to exacerbate white fears of black refugees, even as, in other respects, they 
advanced the arguments for African American equality.24 
 
Sensitive to the nuances of nineteenth-century sensibilities when it comes to the subject of 
black refugees, historians have sometimes shied clear of parsing the convergences and the 
contradictions in white, northern attitudes that contemporary language revealed. There was, 
for example, a revealing overlap in the medicalized language deployed both by courts-martial 
dealing with cases of “plunder and outrage” committed by white troops (or, indeed, white 
surgeons) and by commanders such as Eaton when discussing the black refugee crisis. In 
both cases, concern was expressed over the psychological impact on Union troops exposed, 
on the one hand, to acts of violence perpetrated by their comrades upon non-combatants or, 
on the other, to the desperate plight of black families fleeing slavery. In both cases the fear 
revolved around the potential “infection” of the troops and, by extrapolation, “the destruction 
of their efficiency.”25 
 
In some cases these concatenations were simply a reflection of confusion. There is no doubt 
that many of those who encountered the black refugee population, or who were officially 
charged with its administration, expressed varying degrees of ambiguity about the situation 
even as they struggled to offer what aid they could. Thomas Sherman, for example, had 
described the freed-people he witnessed on the Sea Islands early in 1862 in terms similar to 
those that Eaton would later use in his recollections of the refugee “hordes” that met Union 
troops at the end of that year in Tennessee. Sherman described the Sea Island inhabitants as 
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“uneducated, ignorant, and improvident,” and a palpable threat to the Union cause, even as he 
worked to secure “provisions for the pressing necessities” of what he defined as “this 
unfortunate and now interesting class of people.” Eaton’s response differed only in degree as 
he contemplated not just the “infection” and “demoralization” of Union troops but the 
“veritable moral chaos” that resulted from what he considered to be the unrealistic 
expectations placed upon the Union army by the black refugees themselves.26 
 
Eaton was not naïve about the difficulties that the fugitives faced. Frequently, he noted, the 
“slaves met prejudices against their color more bitter than any they had left behind.” But, 
equally, he was aware that from the perspective of the refugees themselves individual 
prejudice was of less significance than the fact that, as he put it, “their own interests” 
appeared to be “identical…with the objects of our armies.” The crux of the problem, 
however, lay here; in this fraught encounter, on the middle-ground between slavery and 
freedom, on the battlefields between the Union and the Confederacy, between “an army of 
slaves and fugitives” and “an army of fighting men, perpetually on the defensive and 
perpetually ready to attack.” That the actions of the black refugees forced a reckoning that 
resulted, in the end, in federal intervention in the form of the creation of the Freedmen’s 
Bureau in 1865 did little to alleviate the suffering of those on the front line during the war 
itself. Their agency was materially and medically compromised by their own pressing 
physical needs and by the fact that they were initially invisible to the Union Army because 
neither its military nor its medical remit was configured to include the care of refugees. In 
many respects, in fact, black refugees, slaves fleeing slavery, were not distinguished among 
the many and various groups of refugees that Union troops encountered. Initially lumped 
together in what was regarded, for valid military reasons, as a logistical burden on operational 
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objectives, the visibility of black refugees only became assured because their health was so 
bad, their suffering so obvious and, above all, their future status so uncertain.27   
 
Faced with displaced people whose “condition was appalling…men, women, and children in 
every stage of disease or decrepitude, often nearly naked, with flesh torn by the terrible 
experiences of their escapes,” it may be no surprise that Eaton’s reaction was, in part, a 
panicked one. It was a panic shared by many Union commanders, who sent back increasingly 
desperate dispatches from all across the South. Writing from Florida at the start of 1862, 
Brigadier-General Horatio Wright described the shortage of supplies for his troops 
occasioned by the need to distribute supplies “to citizens and contrabands to keep them from 
starvation.” Similarly, in Louisiana, the “large and constantly increasing number” of refugees 
congregating around the Union camp that summer were “quite destitute of provisions, many 
of them having eaten nothing for days except what our soldiers have given them from their 
own rations,” one officer reported. Unless “supplied with the means of sustaining life, by the 
benevolence of the military authorities or of the citizens (which is scarcely supposable)” he 
observed, wryly, “they must shortly be reduced to suffering and starvation, in the very sight 
of the overflowing store-houses of the Government.” From Arkansas in the autumn came 
reports of the worsening “sickness and mortality” affecting the refugee population. As 
Colonel Charles Fox of the Fifty-Fifth Massachusetts Volunteers (Colored) watched black 
refugees fleeing toward Charleston, he saw the situation clearly. To “them it appeared a flight 
from slavery to freedom,” but many, Fox sadly concluded, simply “perished from want and 
disease in an overcrowded city.”28 
 
Historians have, however, perhaps too readily located the many reports of the suffering and 
sickness that presented among black refugees within the racialized discourse of the mid-
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nineteenth century. Even as the extent and nature of that suffering becomes ever more 
apparent to us, as apparent as it was to men like Sherman, Eaton, Fox and many others at the 
time and, after 1863, increasingly apparent to the northern press and public, the assumption 
persists that these reports are compromised by the “bias and racism” of their authors. We 
charge Union authorities for not doing enough and, at the same time, assume that what they 
did do they did in the shadow of slavery. Yet, biased or not, these reports are themselves 
indicative of a crucial change in perception regarding black refugees as the war extended both 
its reach and, after 1863, its remit. Increasingly, the “contraband” was represented neither as 
opportunity for Union officers to acquire free labour nor as exotic accompaniment to the 
stirring scenes of war, but as both military and medical victim and, at the same time, as 
potential military and medical threat. In short, the “contraband” was transformed into the 
“refugee,” a status that had been, and remained for some, a contested one in the early stages 
of what was, after all, a civil conflict that many had assumed would be brief and few had 
anticipated would involve the mass displacement of populations.29 
 
At the war’s start, Union commanders did not see those African Americans fleeing either 
from battle or brutality as refugees; certainly not as the term is understood today. What many 
did see was either a potential resource that Union forces might deploy to their benefit “for 
military purposes” or individuals who were “simply fugitive from the ordinary condition of 
labor for their class.” In the case of the latter, and following the orders of General George B. 
McClellan, Union commanders were simply instructed to dismiss them from camp. Given the 
Constitutional and legal context of slavery in 1861, it may be no surprise that Butler’s clever 
concept of the “contraband” complicated but hardly resolved the question of the status of 
slaves fleeing slavery. The term was at best, as Kate Masur has argued, “a placeholder,” one 
that “signaled that the nation was at a crossroads” on the subject of slavery and emancipation; 
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and it was a crossroads revealed in the complication of language surrounding it. The idea of 
the fugitive, obviously enough, carried overtones of criminality. Contraband was an 
intermediate terms between property and, as used by Butler and others, person. But refugee, 
when applied to the South’s black population, implied dependency. Unlike white refugees, 
whose refugee status was understood to be temporary, black refugees’ uncertain status 
between slave and citizen increasingly aligned them with immigrants. And, as had been 
common in the antebellum era, when concerns over foreign (mainly but not exclusively Irish) 
contagion were rife, this outsider identifier carried not just the fear of dependency but of 
disease. Over time, too, it became increasingly gendered in its application, but especially 
after 1863, when the Union began officially to recruit African American men into the Union 
army.30   
 
Union commanders such as Eaton and Fox did not, arguably, fully share the racial prejudices 
of their era but they did, clearly, ascribe to its broader social, gender, and medical concerns. 
For Fox, there was nothing “ludicrous” about the “exodus” of refugees from the plantations 
of the South, but, equally, he was concerned that the war was producing a dependent 
population that would strain, possibly to breaking point, the resources of the Union army, and 
undermine the economic stability of the Union itself. For him, as for Eaton who became the 
colonel of the 63rd Infantry (Colored), the answer partly lay in the recruitment of former 
slaves into the Union army, but this, perhaps inevitably, exacerbated the already evident 
gender divisions within the black refugee population as this was seen by northern combatants 
and non-combatants alike. Increasingly, as the image of the black male refugee defaulted to 
Union soldier that of “contraband” defaulted to female and to family; both simplifications of 
a more complex reality, of course, but both potent markers for northern understanding of the 
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southern black refugee problem as one dominated, if not entirely defined, by gender and by 
health.31  
 
Ben Butler, no fan of black regiments, had made the point sharply enough to Secretary of 
War Edwin M. Stanton long before these regiments were officially raised. “I cannot feed the 
white men within my lines,” he had raged to Stanton from New Orleans in the spring of 1862: 
“Women and children are actually starving, in spite of all that I can do.” But a year later, by 
which time the debate over the efficacy of black soldiers was in full swing, the suffering of 
the non-combatant black population was undiminished. One particularly stark report from 
Memphis in the winter of early 1863 highlighted the plight of young, female refugees literally 
caught on the road between slavery and freedom, but also revealed the limitations of northern 
understandings of the stark choices facing fleeing slaves. “Homeless, friendless, they 
congregate in the large cotton sheds and vacant buildings here,” the writer observed, 
“sleeping, clustered together like swine, in the straw, endeavoring thus to keep warm during 
the cold, wet night. Not a few,” it was noted, “sometimes fail to straighten out and get up 
with their fellows in the morning, disease and debility having been relieved over night by 
death. Lying like a dead brute in the litter, a mockery of dirty rags for covering, flung an hour 
or so after into the earth,” the reporter concluded, “the contraband’s death is more miserable 
than her life.”32  
 
The inevitability of disease aggravating the already parlous physical condition of black 
refugees was something that the Union army had long been aware of; not least because so 
many of its own troops suffered from a range of ailments, including malaria, smallpox, and 
scurvy, the latter presenting as the most obvious physical effect of malnutrition, fatigue and 
exposure, the whole exacerbated by the psychological stresses of combat and its 
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consequences. Disease was just one more enemy, deadlier than the Confederate foe in many 
cases, with which Union commanders had to contend. In that wider disease landscape, 
Butler’s frustration at the federal government’s lack of support for black refugees benefits 
from contextualization. Battling to clean up a city that had witnessed frequent annual 
outbreaks of malaria and the “deadly ravages” of yellow fever, along with the many and 
varied ailments attendant upon unsanitary urban environments, and lacking “a single surgeon 
in his army who had ever seen a case of yellow fever,” Butler was more aware than most of 
the potential dangers of contagion. And yet, as far as black refugees were concerned, he never 
identified that particular population either as the source of the problem or likely to exacerbate 
it. Sickness, like starvation was, for Butler, a threat that black and white alike faced in the 
conflict conditions that pertained across the South, from Newbern to New Orleans and all 
points between. In this respect, however, Butler was the exception, and not the rule.33 
 
For the Union’s military leaders, the medical threat that black refugees posed to the armies 
seemed obvious. Many, like Ulysses S. Grant, felt an “obligation” to protect the “troops 
against the diseases and demoralization to which contact” with the refugees exposed them. 
And some, like Surgeon and Health Officer A. W. Kelly, took drastic steps in this direction. 
Concerned, as Butler was in New Orleans, by the very real risk of “pestilential diseases” 
impacting Natchez, Mississippi, Kelly, unlike Butler, identified the most “serious danger to 
the health of this City” as resulting “from the congregation within its limits of the large 
numbers of idle negroes which now throng the streets, lanes and alleys, and over-crowd every 
hovel. Lazy and profligate, unused to caring for themselves,” Kelly complained, this 
particular refugee population was only “fit to engender and rapidly disseminate the most 
loathsome and malignant diseases.” His solution, to ban any unemployed “contraband” from 
the city, refugee or not, drew protests from military and medical personnel alike as well as 
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from northern ministers. Shocked by the implicit cruelty of the order, they were equally 
dismayed by its likely impact on any black Union soldier whose “mother or his wife has been 
driven from her quiet and comfortable home” whilst he was risking “his life in the cause of 
his country now struggling for its life.”34  
 
Whilst there was, obviously, a real threat of contagion and cross-contamination in the conflict 
zone between combatants and non-combatants, it was by no means a given that it worked in 
one direction, from refugee to soldier, alone. Nevertheless, too many Union doctors, 
voluntary aid workers, missionaries and administrative personnel, faced with the medical 
realities of a refugee population both in the field and in camp, echoed Kelly’s assumptions. 
They elided the etiological environment of the black refugee crisis and confused causes and 
symptoms. They did so in part because they lacked comprehension of disease causation but 
also because contemporary racial assumptions surrounding both disease and dependency, 
particularly in relation to black women, determined their perspective. But this perspective, as 
Gretchen Long reminds us, was complex: comprising notions “of duty and charity, empathy 
and racial superiority,” it was frequently contradictory both in theory and in practice. Health, 
however, was the fulcrum of this perspective and of the northern martial and medical agenda 
as that impacted black refugees during the war and, arguably, for decades after it; health and 
its antithesis, disease.35  
 
In essence, northerners over the course of the Civil War began to medicalize the black 
refugee body, in particular the female body, and, by extrapolation, medicalized the process of 
emancipation. This process, too, however, must be placed in the wider context of the war, and 
in particular northern concerns about the moral and medical health of white Union troops and 
that of the nation itself. Because it is no real surprise that a Union surgeon such as Kelly 
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evinced such an “ideological muddle” in regards to black refugees, influenced as so many 
northerners were not just by traditional understandings of health and freedom in a republican 
context but by very specific popular interpretations of slavery and national sickness. 
Described as “an ulcer” that threatened the Union’s “vitals” by prominent northern preacher 
Henry Ward Beecher, and as a “deadly virus” that would “poison the blood” of the republic 
by Frederick Douglass, slavery, at the start of the Civil War carried metaphorical medical 
baggage that left the slaves themselves in a precarious position once the system began to 
disintegrate. Military health was deemed in danger of being compromised by what was 
regarded as a veritable “invasion of white society by black bodies.” And, in the context of the 
extent of sickness, much of it the result of malnutrition, neglect, and human violence, that 
presented within the black refugee population it was not too long before “the afflicted were 
themselves treated as the disease.”36 
 
Yet the identification of black refugees themselves, rather than the illnesses they suffered 
from, as the problem, and the concomitant representation of Union forces as, in effect, white 
cells clustered around a potential source of infection, was only part of the medicalized 
narrative of emancipation. And whilst it may be the case that, with increased visibility came 
increased awareness of the black refugee health crisis, the interaction between contraband 
and combatant remained a cause for concern for Union authorities and the northern public 
alike over the course of the war. Infection, when used in relation to the impact of black 
refugees on Union troops, never stood alone, as the language of military reports, newspapers 
and courts-martial made clear. It was always paired with “demoralization,” a vague term in 
many respects but applied, with a degree of confidence in its contemporary context, to the 
Union soldier deemed to be at risk as much from moral deterioration as from medical 
infection via contact with black refugees in general, but female refugees in particular. The 
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overlap between courts-martial cases and the medical narrative of the Civil War as both 
related to interactions between Union troops and black refugees located a potential source of 
infection in the image of the female “contraband.” Her unique role as victim of violence and 
virus alike located her at the very heart of the discourse predicated on disease and 
demoralization that dominated northern thinking both on the battlefield and beyond it.37 
 
Conclusion 
 
Historians have long often understood that the fear of dependency informed northern 
reactions to black, female refugees, but this was only one part of the calculus of race and 
national reconstruction to emerge from the Civil War. As the black, male narrative 
increasingly took a martial turn, especially after 1863, its female counterpart traced a 
medicalized trajectory encompassing several discrete gender, racial, social, military and 
moral concerns. African American men could, with ample justification, metaphorically wave 
the bloody shirt, establish their martial manhood, and assert future citizenship rights. African 
American women, by contrast, as perceived (although usually not actual) dependents, as 
victims of violence, served simultaneously as sites of compassion but also potential contagion 
in a nation facing the moral challenge of squaring its ideals with its racial realities. In this 
respect, nineteenth-century gendered assumptions concerning familial and, by extrapolation 
societal stability and national health informed the emphasis that northern missionaries and the 
public alike placed on the worlds of African American women.  It was black women, for 
example, that Laura Towne concentrated on in her missionary efforts in part because of her 
belief that under slavery “the woman was far more important, and was in every way held 
higher than the man.” It was the women, albeit the “horribly ugly old women” in Towne’s 
pejorative description, who understood that “[w]e got to keep clean or we’ll all be sick.”38  
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Scholars have largely confined their analysis of Towne’s perspective, and that of other 
northern abolitionist and missionary volunteers in the South, to the relatively narrow but 
certainly influential discourse of disease and disorder, along with the class dynamic that 
underpinned this, that prevailed in the nineteenth century.39 In the context of America’s civil 
conflict, however, the threat of disorder spilled over into the Union Army itself, and was 
located within the actions of white men as much as in the supposedly disorderly bodies of 
black refugees. Union soldiers were increasingly perceived, by their commanders and by 
Union surgeons alike, to be at risk of contamination, whether from contact with black bodies 
either in fact or in imagination deemed to be diseased, or from the moral corruption offered 
by those white Union personnel prepared to commit consistent, sometimes sexual, but hardly 
secret acts of appalling violence against black women. For Union authorities, indeed, the 
latter posed perhaps the most risk, impacting as it threatened to do not just on the order and 
discipline of the Union army, but that of the nation itself; a nation demoralized by the 
physical and psychological costs of conflict, secured as it had been by a volunteer citizen 
soldiery decimated by death and disease, and uncertain about the future impact on the nation 
of its newly freed southern black population. 
 
In this wider conflict context, the confusion and contradictions that defined Union 
engagement with black refugees revealed the extent to which the essence of the nation’s 
wartime collective space was fluid: defended by battle, it was increasingly defined, as the war 
progressed, by both military and medical forces and by the former slaves themselves. Yet this 
last was problematic for many northerners, whose understanding of the emancipation process 
was informed and influenced by a larger, national discourse concerning the health of the 
nation. Long used to evoking the body politic in corporeal terms before the Civil War, and in 
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the face of the very real physical costs of the conflict, it was perhaps inevitable that many 
northerners located emancipation within a medical rather than a military discourse. The Civil 
War’s black refugee crisis, in effect, rendered the various pathways to freedom more 
medicalized than militarized largely because America’s civil conflict did not, like many other 
conflicts, “dismantle” its “moral universe to serve the cause of war.”40 Quite the opposite. 
However erratically and imperfectly, the Union cause contained within it the imperative to 
construct a different, more moral universe in tune with the nation’s purported ideals 
respecting freedom and equality. This process forced many northerners to see clearly what 
they had, prior to 1861, largely, and in many respects willfully ignored: the reality, and the 
medical and material repercussions, of slavery. 
 
By the end of America’s civil war, Union soldiers and northern civilians alike had become 
all-too painfully familiar with an image of the black, female refugee that was a world away 
from that of Harriet Beecher Stowe’s heroine fleeing to freedom across the ice floes of the 
Ohio. The fictional Eliza had been replaced, in northern public consciousness, by the far from 
fictional image of female slaves dying on the frozen ground of Kentucky or Tennessee; their 
fate reported in northern newspapers and periodicals and confirmed by the first-hand 
testimonies of northern missionaries and military personnel who had direct contact with the 
black refugee population and by the records of courts-martial that had ruled on cases 
concerning them. Such close contact may, as Matthew Calvin has recently proposed, have 
“taught Northern soldiers that the men and women of African descent who stood before them 
were not the racial caricatures they had been led to believe populated the South,” except that 
the national conflict had created caricatures of its own as far as the former slaves were 
concerned. If “reports from northern aid workers and other publicity temporarily made the 
contraband a cultural icon in American culture,” it was nevertheless the case that the more 
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consistent gender, medical and social components of that culture determined the direction of 
travel that federal support for the former slaves would follow in terms of securing family 
units patterned upon settled, white norms and that took little account of the destabilizing 
impact of enslavement.41 
 
In this respect, the ways in which the military and the medical interacted and overlapped in 
the response to the Civil War’s black refugees speaks to the wider scholarly debates 
surrounding war and health and, in particular, the experiences of and responses to refugees, 
past and present. Because, unfortunately, much of what became evident to northern 
missionaries, Union soldiers, and courts-martial over the course of the American Civil War in 
regards to female refugees and sexual exploitation in particular still finds its echo in modern 
debates over the abuse of displaced and vulnerable women and children either caught up in or 
seeking to escape from conflict environments. The lessons that contemporary medical and 
humanitarian aid personnel might take from the mid-nineteenth century’s black refugee crisis, 
however, remain embedded in the fluidity of America’s conflict landscape. Mapping that 
landscape, and identifying those areas where black refugees managed to achieve some 
traction against traditional racial, gender, and medical assumptions and those areas where 
they were unable to do so, is therefore more than an historical exercise. Writing about the 
present day, Charles Watters encourages us to relinquish “the idealized benevolent position 
our societies claim to embody,” and to recognize instead the “ambivalence toward self and 
others” that really defines and determines public, political and professional reactions to the 
dispossessed.42 In this respect, America’s civil conflict provides crucial evidence that could, 
arguably should inform official and public responses to contemporary refugee crises, 
highlighting as it does the importance of challenging, and combatting the fear not just of 
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contagion but change that the image of the refugee continues to invoke in the modern nation-
state.43 
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